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Abstract
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in the Philippines has 
promoted participatory irrigation management (PIM) in Communal 
Irrigation Systems (CISs) since the mid-1970s; however, CIS performance 
has generally been poor. One exception is the Busao CIS in Bohol Province 
and its water users association (WUA), the BATS Irrigators’ Association 
(IA). This study examines the factors behind the successful management of 
the Busao CIS and BATS IA, using the theories of common-pool resources 
management proposed by Ostrom (1990) and Freeman (1989, 1992). The 
fundamental reason for the successful performance of the BATS IA is that 
it uses a distributional share system, which Freeman refers to as the heart 
of an effective WUA. In the BATS IA, the irrigation service fee (ISF) is set 
as 10% of the harvested rice, which is considered to be almost equivalent 
to the volume of water a member receives. Thus, the water volumes 
received by each member are roughly proportionate to the share of system 
costs paid by each member. Additionally, the BATS IA conducted canal 
cementing to ensure that irrigation water can reach downstream, based 
on external aids from the Embassy of Japan (EOJ) and the NIA. Further, 
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the IA water tender monitors and cleans the canals every day to avoid 
a water shortage. Consequently, the BATS IA can attain equal water 
distribution within the CIS. Moreover, the number of members on the 
Board of Directors selected from each barangay (village) is proportionate 
to the number of IA members of each barangay. As such, in the BATS IA, 
a member’s share of cost is proportionate to his/her share of water and 
share of vote. Therefore, a distributional share system exists in the BATS 
IA, and the sense of fairness is shared among IA members. In addition, 
the BATS IA has sophisticated irrigation management systems that fit the 
theories of Ostrom and Freeman. Therefore, the BATS IA has cooperative 
IA members that participate in IA activities and follow IA bylaws, leading 
to equal water distribution across all parts. The irrigation facilities are 
also successfully operated and maintained by the BATS IA. There are 
few conflicts, and the IA can attain 100% ISF collection. Further, since the 
BATS IA has the ability to negotiate with outsiders such as the NIA, local 
government, and EOJ, the latter can assign the IA with many projects and 
provide assistance. Consequently, the BATS IA has stable and successful 
IA management in the long run. 
I. Introduction
　In irrigation management, irrigation management transfer (IMT) has 
become popular worldwide. IMT aims to transfer the management of an 
irrigation system, which was managed by the government until the canals 
reached their lowest level, to the beneficiary farmers (i.e., water users). To 
make IMT successful, it is necessary to establish participatory irrigation 
management (PIM) in which a water users association (WUA) manages the 
irrigation system. IMT is expected to not only reduce the government’s 
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management costs, but also improve the management efficiency of 
irrigation systems owing to the intensive management undertaken by 
beneficiary farmers. 
　Since the mid-1970s, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) 
in the Philippines has promoted the PIM approach for Communal 
Irrigation Systems (CISs), which irrigate farmer-owned and -managed 
areas below 1000 ha. In the 1980s, the NIA expanded this approach to 
National Irrigation Systems (NISs), which are owned and managed by the 
government and cover more than 1000 ha. The NIA assigns an Institutional 
Development Officer (IDO) to the irrigated area to organize a WUA, 
referred to as an Irrigators’ Association (IA), before the construction of any 
CISs and NISs (Bagadion and Korten, 1991).
　However, the performance of PIM has generally been poor (Maleza and 
Nishimura, 2007). The average collection rate of the Irrigation Service 
Fee (ISF) from 1998 to 2000 was only 38% for NISs, and 80% of NISs 
were reported to need prompt repair. Moreover, a survey by the NIA of 
1674 IAs in 1999 showed that 38% of these IAs were not functional (KRI 
International Corporation, 2001).
　Nonetheless, some successful cases can be found, including the Busao CIS 
in Bohol Province in the Philippines and its WUA, namely the BATS IA. 
Thus, this study examines the factors behind the successful management of 
the Busao CIS and BATS IA, using the theories of common-pool resource 
(CPR) management proposed by Ostrom (1990) and Freeman (1989, 1992). 
　The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, the analytical 
framework and methodology of the study are presented. Next, the 
irrigation system and IA are described. Then, the performance of the 
irrigation system is evaluated. Finally, in the conclusion, the reasons for the 
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successful management of the system are considered.
II. Analytical Framework and Methodology
1) Theories of CPR Management
　Evaluating the management of an irrigation system demands an 
appropriate analytical framework. Since the irrigation water and system 
that delivers water to beneficiary farmers are considered to be CPRs, 
which are commonly managed by local people, the author applies Ostrom’s 
(1990) design principles of long-enduring CPRs and Freeman’s (1989, 1992) 
distributional share system model to assess performance. 
　Ostrom’s (1990) design principles are illustrated by case studies of long-
enduring CPR institution, such as the Philippines’ Zanjera traditional 
irrigation system and cattle grazing on the Swiss Alps. According to 
Ostrom (1990), although there are differences among CPR settings, long-
enduring and self-governing CPR institutions share eight design principles. 
If a CPR institution does not share these eight design principles, it cannot 
avoid free-riders, who break its rules and appropriate resources unfairly 
without fulfilling their obligations as members of the institution. As a 
result, the deterioration and dysfunction of the CPR institution ensues, 
finally leading to the depletion and destruction of the resources themselves 
(see Table 1) (Ostrom, 1990)ⅰ.
　Freeman’s conceptual model is equivalent to Ostrom’s design principles; 
however, it is specially formulated to apply to irrigation systems and 
WUAs. His conceptual model was drawn from his own case studies in the 
ⅰ　For a detailed explanation of the eight design principles of long-enduring CPR 
institutions, see Ostrom (1990, pp.88-102). Ostrom was awarded a Nobel Prize for 
economics in 2009 because of this research on CPR management.
────────────
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western United States, Pakistan, and Nepal as well as from other case 
studies of successful irrigation systems globally. According to Freeman, 
to manage an irrigation system successfully, a WUA should be sufficiently 
Table 1. Ostrom’s design principles illustrated by long-enduring common-
pool resources (CPR) institutions
1. Clearly defined boundaries
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resources units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and/or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules.
4. Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are 
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) 
by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by 
both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to 
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged 
by external governmental authorities.
8. (For CPRs that are parts of larger systems) Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Source: Ostrom (1990:90).
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effective to provide efficient and equitable water control. Indeed, Freeman 
(1989, 1992) presents six essential characteristics of an effective WUA, as 
shown in Table 2.
　Among these six essential characteristics, Freeman categorizes the 
third and fourth ones as the “water share distributional system” (i.e., a 
distributional share system) and points out that this system is at the heart 
of any effective WUA. 
　Freeman (2009) states that if the first four attributes, namely local 
leadership (attribute 1), the leadership responsibility of local members 
(attribute 2), and the existence of a distributional share system (attributes 
3 and 4), are fulfilled, the remaining two (water control ability and the 
propensity of members to support the local organization) will be realized. 
Therefore, the last two attributes are outcomes of the first four.
　On the contrary, if the irrigation system lacks a distributional share 
system, upstream farmers have no incentive to invest in activities aimed at 
improving the condition of the canals in the downstream part. This results 
in inequitable water distribution between upstream and downstream 
Table 2. Freeman’s six essential characteristics of an effective WUA
1 Leaders of the local organization should not be cosmopolitan outsiders but 
irrigators representing the various reaches of the local canal system.
2 Leadership and staff of the local organization are responsible to local 
members.
3 Water delivery is dependent on the fulfillment of organizational obligations 
(distributional share system).
4 The water share system should remove head and tail distinctions in service 
queues (distributional share system).
5 Water resource control of members is high.
6 Propensity of members to support the local organization is high.
Source: Freeman (1989:25).
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farmers (Freeman, 1992), lowering the ability of the WUA to control water 
as well as the propensity of downstream members to support the WUA 
(Freeman, 2009).
　Indeed, Freeman (1992) points out that a sense of fairness must be 
shared among WUA members to manage an irrigation system sustainably 
in the long run. Hence, a distributional share system should be introduced 
into WUA management, which has the following three aspects: (1) share of 
water, (2) share of cost, and (3) share of vote. 
　While water share arrangements may vary considerably from locale to 
locale, Freeman (1992) points out the three important considerations to 
making WUAs successful. First, each member’s share of water should be 
equivalent to his/her share of cost; that is, the water volumes received by 
each member are roughly proportionate to the share of system costs paid 
by each member. Second, a WUA should remove head and tail distinctions 
in the service queue; it provides the same volume of water per unit area in 
the command area of the irrigation system. To do so, it needs to measure 
the water volume used on each member’s farmland. Third, conflicts in a 
WUA are resolved based on each member’s share of vote. 
　On the above-mentioned second consideration, Freeman (1992) explains, 
“The water share system overcomes the problem of distributing 
inequitable volumes of water to the head and tail location of irrigators
…Head irrigators are uninterested in spending their money on behalf 
of those less well located. [Therefore,] head-tail problems can hobble 
WUA’s. On the other hand, it is quite possible to organize the head-
tail distinction out of the irrigation community and create a common 
interest of all - head and tail - in the performance of the canals. 
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Irrigators do this by measuring water volume delivered to the field 
gate. If water is distributed by volume, or some rough approximation 
of it, and if a poorly performing canal delivers a given volume only 
over a longer period of time toward the tails, and if ‘head’ farmers 
cannot obtain their next delivery until the tails are served, they will 
feel the pinch of poorly performing canals and become interested 
in their improvement. Water lost downstream is also lost to [head 
farmers]. All irrigators then share a common interest in investing in 
the best possible canal management.” (Freeman, 1992, p. 3) 
　Freeman’s distributional share system means that a member’s share of 
cost for system management is proportionate to his/her share of water 
and share of vote in the management of a WUA. If a member’s share of 
cost is larger, his/her share of water and share of vote in the WUA will 
also be larger (Freeman, 1992). This is clearly decided as the WUA’s rule 
and applied in WUA management. In addition, a WUA should have a 
management rule that if a member receives more benefits (e.g., water in a 
timely way) than do other members, he/she must pay more management 
costs (e.g., via an ISF or in labor, materials, etc.). If the member receives 
less water than others, his/her management cost should be less (Freeman, 
2009). 
　According to Freeman (1992), if a distributional share system is 
introduced into WUA management and if the equity (i.e., equivalence of 
each WUA member’s share of cost and share of water) is made known 
among WUA members, any non-payer or free-rider who breaks the equity 
among beneficiaries will be readily identified and sanctioned. Therefore, 
each member will be inclined to comply with the rules and members will 
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be able to resolve conflicts among themselves.
　On the contrary, if such free-riders are not sanctioned, other members 
also tend to act in the same manner. Hence, free-rider behavior becomes 
prevalent in the irrigation system. This discourages members who 
are honest and good payers, who may choose to withdraw from WUA 
management. Then, the activities of the WUA become inactive and the 
performance of the irrigation system drops (Freeman, 2008).  
　A sense of fairness must thus be constantly shared among members for 
a WUA to be successful. To encourage this understanding of fairness, the 
obligation of each member must be equivalent to his/her benefit and must 
be known to all members. That is, the volume of water received by each 
member and organizational obligations (e.g., ISF payment and provision of 
labor) borne by each member must be clear to all. Therefore, the volume 
of water delivered to each member’s farmland must be measured. In 
addition, the irrigation system must have suitable irrigation facilities (canals 
and farm ditches) to provide irrigation water to the farmland of individual 
member.
　On the contrary, if members share common turnouts and, therefore, do 
not know the exact volume of water used by each member, any members 
who feel their burden is larger than their benefit will be dissatisfied, 
possibly leading to withdrawal from the WUA. However, it is difficult 
for central government agencies or large donors to design detailed plans 
for irrigation facilities that cover every farm ditch and turnout at the 
individual farm level because of insufficient labor, budget, and construction 
periods. Such complicated work should thus be undertaken at the local 
level (Freeman, 2008).
　For this reason, Freeman states the importance of local leaders and 
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staff being accountable to local members (the first and second essential 
characteristics). As an outsider, a staff member of the central government 
agency, even one with deep knowledge of irrigation engineering and highly 
motivated to do his/her job of managing irrigation systems, cannot attain 
the specific local knowledge on individual irrigation systems that is needed 
for the management of an effective distributional share system at the site. 
Furthermore, an outsider would be unable to create local social capital, 
which is necessary for resolving the conflicts and problems that occur in 
irrigation systems among beneficiaries. Such conflicts and problems should 
be resolved by local people themselves; accordingly, the members of the 
Board of Directors (BOD) and staff should be composed of local farmers 
(Freeman, 1992). 
　In sum, Freeman’s distributional share system means that a member’s 
water delivery and voice are dependent on the fulfillment of organizational 
obligations (a member’s share of water and share of vote are proportionate 
to his/her share of cost), and water is allocated equally from the upstream 
to the downstream parts in the irrigation system. In this way, the head and 
tail distinction of water delivery is removed from the irrigation system. 
Therefore, to introduce a distributional share system, an irrigation system 
needs to pursue the following six aims:
(1) To secure sufficient water sources for the irrigation system; 
(2) To have irrigation facilities that can allocate water equally to the 
whole irrigation system from the head to the tail parts (i.e., allocate 
the same volume of water per ha); 
(3) To make clear to WUA members the volume of water each member 
receives and the obligations fulfilled by the member, therefore levying 
the ISF by volume of water (not by size of farmland), and to measure 
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the volume of water delivered to each farmland; 
(4) To have a WUA with a monitoring function that can enforce sanctions 
on the violators of WUA rules and that can resolve conflicts to avoid 
free-rider behaviors; 
(5) To have a leader with strong leadership skills and support from 
members, thereby allowing the WUA to enforce the management 
rules; and 
(6) To have a good relationship between the WUA and government 
organizations and to ensure that these government organizations 
have sufficient funds and technical skills so that the WUA has the 
necessary support at the appropriate time from governments and/or 
donors.
　Case studies of successful irrigation systems that have distributional 
share systems and Freeman’s (1989, 1992) essential characteristics of 
effective WUAs have been carried out (Freeman, 1992; Maass and 
Anderson, 1978; Martin and Yoder, 1988; Siy, 1982). This study assesses the 
successful performance of the Busao CIS in Bohol Province, Philippines, 
using Freeman’s essential characteristics of effective WUAs and Ostrom’s 
design principles. Among Ostrom’s eight design principles, the second 
(congruence between appropriation and provisional rules and local 
conditions) is considered to be equivalent to Freeman’s third essential 
characteristics, namely that water delivery is dependent on the fulfillment 
of organizational obligations (i.e., the distributional share system). 
2) Research Method
　The author uses the field data gathered from surveys of various 
stakeholders involved in the Busao CIS in Bohol Province in February 
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1998, August 1999, and August 2005. Each field survey in 1998 and 1999 
lasted two to three weeks, and that in 2005 lasted one day. The survey 
was conducted by using Rapid Rural Appraisal, especially semi-structured 
interviews and participatory observations. The interviews asked about 
respondents’ activities in the IA, farm, and social settings as well as their 
social and family relations. Interviewees consisted of the members of the 
BOD, employees and ordinary members of the BATS IA of the Busao CIS, 
officials of the NIA, and staff of the local government of the municipality 
and villages (barangays) in which the Busao CIS is located. 
III. Description of the Busao CIS 
　The Busao CIS spreads to four barangays: Santo Rosario (including 
one resident from Bitaugan) in Municipality Antequella and Toril, Busao, 
and Agahay in Municipality Maribojoc, Bohol Province. The Busao CIS 
is located 14 kilometers (30 minutes by car) from Tagbilaran, the capital 
city of Bohol Province. It is located in a rather isolated inland area (see 
Figure 1). Access to the Busao CIS is insufficient because people have to 
enter via a terraneous provincial road from a paved national road. In 1998, 
a public bus travelled to and from Tagbilaran three times a day; another 
main transportation system was habal habal (motorbike taxi). Further, in 
1998, three people owned cars in the Busao CIS area, but Mr. M, the IA 
President, was the only one who drove his car daily.
　Farmers in this area are mostly small landowners or small tenant 
farmers, and thus the economic gap between famers is small. Landholding 
size varies from 0.01 to 1.27 ha, and the average size is 0.18 ha. Moreover, 
farmland is inherited equally by all children. Therefore, landholding size 
has become smaller from generation to generation. Since a person inherits 
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farmland from both the father’s and mother’s sides of the family, his/her 
farms are typically dispersed in the area. As such, people produce rice 
mainly for home consumption, not for sale.
　In this area, many formal and informal organizations exist in a barangay, 
such as those for funerals, weddings, bayanihan (mutual assistance), hog 
hog (informal lending), transplanting, and harvesting. Residents in the 
same barangay have close and multiple social relationships. In the evening, 
people gather at the waiting shade of their barangay or in front of the sali 
sali store (grocery store), and engage in close information exchanges. Most 
residents are devoted Catholics, so there is a chapel in each barangay. 
Among them, only Busao Chapel in Barangay Busao holds mass every 
Sunday; thus, it plays the role of the central church among the five 
barangays. 
　Residents from different barangays are not necessarily as acquainted as 
those from the same barangay; however, they know each other because 
of marriages, land dispersions, or the few permanent migrations or 
immigrations of families in this area. Moreover, they meet each other at 
Busao Chapel as well as at the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) meetings 
of Busao Elementary School and Busao Junior High School, for instance. 
Hence, the residents in this area are socially, economically, and culturally 
homogeneous.
　The irrigation area of the Busao CIS is rather small, at 26 ha, and it 
consists of four kilometers of the main canal. Since there is no lateral canal, 
farmers take water directly from the main canal, which is then delivered to 
other farms from paddy to paddy. Moreover, the irrigation area is divided 
into three sectors, from the upper part downward of Sector Santo Rosario, 
Sector Toril, and Sector Busao (see Figure 2). Since the water source is 
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a natural spring that provides sufficient water throughout the year, the 
Busao CIS has sufficient water in both rainy and dry seasons. 
　The Busao CIS was constructed in 1972 by a Chinese merchant. Based 
on the agreement with the merchant, beneficiary farmers were requested 
to pay 10% of their harvested rice as the ISF to the merchant during 
every cropping season. Since then, farmers have continued this ISF 
payment system. In 1984, beneficiary farmers requested that the NIA 
Bohol Provincial Office rehabilitate the irrigation system. Since the NIA 
requested that farmers organize the IA, as a condition of the rehabilitation 
work, the beneficiary farmers of the Busao CIS organized the BATS IAⅱ in 
1984. By 1998, there were 145 IA members.
　The BATS IA is a strong WUA, named the Most Outstanding IA 
in Region VII in 2003 by the NIA Regional VII Office because of its 
performance as an IA. The Busao CIS is the only CIS that collects 100% 
of the ISF among the 32 CISs in Bohol Province. Since it has sufficient 
water, it provides equal water distribution from the head to tail parts. 
The irrigation facilities are successfully operated and maintained by the 
BATS IA. Moreover, the few conflicts in the IA are easily resolved. In 
addition, since the BATS IA has the ability to negotiate with outsiders, it 
has received many projects and much assistance from outsiders such as 
the NIA, local government (municipality, province), congressmen, and the 
Embassy of Japan (EOJ). For example, the BATS IA received a Grassroots 
Grant Assistance Project from the EOJ in 1999 to construct the concrete 
lining of some parts of the earth canal. 
ⅱ　The name of the BATS IA comes from the first letter of the four barangays, Busao, 
Agahay, Toril, and Santo Rosario.
────────────
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IV. Evaluation of the Organizational Performance of the 
BATS IA 
　This study proposed that the success of the BATS IA is because its 
organizational performance fits the abovementioned theories of Ostrom and 
Freeman, especially in that it has a distributional share system. Freeman’s 
model is first used to assess the BATS IA’s organizational performance.
1) Source of Leadership
　Freeman points out that WUA leaders should be irrigators representing 
the various reaches of the local organization. Freeman’s model stipulates a 
“local leader” that can serve and even unite beneficiary farmers and other 
stakeholders. 
　One of the success factors of the BATS IA is the contribution of Mr. M, 
who has strong leadership skills and has successfully built patron client 
relationships with IA members. 
　Mr. M has been the IA President since 1984; he lives in Barangay Toril, 
the middle part of the Busao CIS, and is a Barangay Captain (Village 
Chief), a political leader of the local area. At the same time, he serves as an 
informal leader. His grandfather and father were also Barangay Captains 
of Toril, and he comes from a local elite family in his barangay. Moreover, 
he is a wealthy person in the community, with a store in Tagbilaran. In 
addition, he commutes to his store everyday using his own car. People 
consider him to be honest, fair, and generous; as such, he has many patron 
client relationships with outside politicians and government officers. By 
using his network, he can provide much assistance to Barangay Toril and 
the Busao CIS. Further, he has strong management skills and has solved 
various problems in CIS management. By using his various positions and 
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skills, he has provided many benefits to his barangay and IA members. 
Not only does he allocate water equally among IA members, but he also 
sometimes brings snacks for the IA General Assembly, using his own 
money. Once, his car was even used as an “ambulance” that took an 
emergency patient to a hospital in Tagbilaran. Additionally, he lends money 
to the barangay people without interestⅲ. Based on such kind manners, 
people respect him.
　Because of the many favors from Mr. M, IA members have become 
indebted to him; thus, they cooperate with certain IA activities such as the 
ISF payment and canal cleaning in which Mr. M asks that they participate. 
In traditional Philippine society, there is a patron client relationship (called 
utang-kabubot-on in Visaya) in which a leader (patron) does favors for 
his/her followers (client); the followers are then indebted to the leader 
and must be loyal to the leader to repay the debt. This seems to be the 
relationship between Mr. M and IA members.  
　At the monthly BOD meeting of the BATS IA, the BOD presents ideas 
on various issues as well as discusses and decides the plan. After the 
meeting, the person who implements the decided plan (e.g., purchase of 
high yield rice seeds for IA members) is always Mr. M, who has strong 
relationships with outsiders. As such, Mr. M is very busy, since he 
simultaneously serves as Barangay Captain of Toril. He always claims that 
he wants to resign because he is too busy or too old to serve, but the BOD 
and IA members do not allow him to resign.
　As he has stated, “My motto is not how much I can take from the 
barangay people, but how much I can give to the people.” Therefore, it 
ⅲ　In Barangay Toril, if one borrows money from a local moneylender, the interest is 
usually 10% per year.
────────────
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seems that his interest is not in accumulating financial wealth, but in 
accumulating social assets from local people (i.e., earning members’ loyalty 
and respect). 
2) Staff Responsibility
　Freeman notes that the leadership and staff of the WUA are responsible 
not to the central government, but to local members. To encourage leaders 
and staff to serve their local members, they should not be appointed by 
the irrigation agency, but selected by a general election held in the WUA. 
Moreover, they should be paid not by the government, but by the local 
members. 
　The BATS IA had 15 members on the BOD in 1998; some members 
were elected as IA President, IA Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, 
Auditor, and Warehouseman. Their monthly allowance was quite low, at 
25 pesos (around $0.60), making it almost a voluntary service for them. 
However, they are appreciated by IA members for their “devoted” 
services. Further, the BATS IA hires a water tender and a bookkeeper as 
staff members, paid a monthly salary.
　The BOD members, including the IA President, are elected at the IA 
election every two years. Most BOD members have been reelected because 
IA members want them to continue their duties. 
　Most BOD members also serve as current or ex-Barangay Captains or 
Officials (see Table 3). They further serve as leaders of local formal and 
informal organizations such as the Catholic Church as well as local political 
and social leaders and, simultaneously, local elites who can manage their 
own barangay members. Moreover, BOD members have close relationships 
with each other (e.g., neighbors, relatives, friends, classmates, church 
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Table 3. The Board of Directors (BOD) of BATS IA in 1998
No Position at the 
IA
Barangay Position at the 
Barangay
Notes
1 BOD Santo 
Rosario
Ex-Barangay 
Captain
2 BOD Bitaugan Ex-Barangay 
Official
Including Santo Rosario
3 IA President＊ Toril Barangay Captain Mr. M. His father and 
grandfather were 
ex-Barangay Captains
4 BOD Toril Ex-Barangay 
Official
5 BOD Toril Barangay Official
6 BOD Toril Barangay Official Mr. M’s cousin
7 Warehouseman Busao n.a. 1992: Owner of sali sali
store. Wife’s father was an
ex-Barangay Captain
8 BOD Busao Barangay 
Treasurer
Husband is a Barangay 
Official
9 BOD Busao Ex-Barangay 
Captain
10 BOD Busao Barangay Captain Husband of Secretary. Father
was an ex-Barangay Captain
11 Treasurer Busao Ex-Barangay 
Official
12 Secretary* Busao n.a. Elementary School Teacher.
Husband is a Barangay 
Captain and BOD member
13 IA Vice  
President*
Agahay Barangay Captain
14 Auditor Agahay Ex-Municipality 
Officer
Father and grandfather were
ex-Barangay Captains
15 BOD Agahay Ex-Barangay 
Captain
Notes: ＊= BOD since 1984 when the BATS IA was established. 
Source: Author’s survey.
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organization officials) and meet frequently. Since they are close to each 
other, they become very active BOD members who cooperate with Mr. M.
3) Distributional Share System
　Freeman points out that the distributional share system is the core of 
any effective WUA. This means that water delivery is dependent on the 
fulfillment of organizational obligations. Moreover, the water share system 
should remove the head and tail distinction in the service queue. As 
mentioned above, Freeman says that a member’s share of cost for system 
management is proportionate to his/her share of water and share of vote.
It can thus be said that the distributional share system has been introduced 
into IA management in the BATS IA. 
　a. Share of Cost at the BATS IA
　In the BATS IA, members’ organizational obligation is the ISF payment. 
Since the beginning of the CIS, farmers have agreed that the ISF is set 
as 10% of the rice harvest. Although many factors influence the size of 
the rice harvest such as fertility, pests, diseases, and amount of sunshine, 
people consider the harvest of rice to be larger (smaller) if they receive 
larger (smaller) amounts of water. Thus, this ISF is considered to be 
roughly proportionate to the volume of water that each member receives.
　Therefore, in the BATS IA, they apply the ISF levied by volume of 
water; here, the share of cost is equivalent to the share of water. This is 
very different from the other CISs in the Philippines, which levy the ISF 
by size of area (e.g., 175 kg (3.5 cavans; 1 cavan=50kg) of rice per ha).
　In the BATS IA, the ISF collection system is also unique. One day before 
the harvest, the water tender of the IA is informed by the tinakin (harvester) 
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that there will be a harvest at a member’s farm the next day. Therefore, 
on the day of the harvest, the water tender and Warehouseman go 
together to the member’s farm. There, the water tender collects 10% of the 
harvested rice. The collection of ISF rice is overseen by the IA member, 
tinakins, and Warehouseman; as such, nobody can escape this ISF payment 
on the farm. In this way, the BATS IA can achieve a 100% ISF collection, 
using this simple yet sophisticated method to avoid free-rider behaviors. 
　However, there are two exceptional previous cases in which members 
did not pay their ISF on the farm. In the late 1980s, one IA member 
tried to secretly take his harvested rice by boat to his house, but he was 
caught and had to pay the 10% ISF. He made an excuse that because of 
unexpected rainfall, he had to take the rice to his house to avoid damage 
and that he did not intend to escape the ISF payment. In the other case, in 
1998 on rotation farming landⅳ, when one farmer from another barangay 
took his turn at cultivation, he did not pay his ISF at the farm, but brought 
his harvested rice directly to the water tender’s house. The water tender 
strictly warned the farmer not to do it again. These are the only cases of 
ISF non-payment on the farm.
　b. Share of Water Allocation in the BATS IA
　In the BATS IA, before 1999, irrigation water was lost at the earth canal 
because of canal leakage; moreover, there was a water shortage at the 
downstream part in the dry season. Therefore, downstream members had 
to receive water by rotation. In 1999, the BATS IA received a Grassroots 
ⅳ　In the Busao area, since the size of farmland is very small, farmers who inherit land do 
not subdivide it, but rather rotate farming during every crop or every year among the 
inheritors.
────────────
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Grant Assistance from the EOJ to construct the concrete lining of some 
parts of the earth canal. After the rehabilitation work, the water shortage 
downstream was resolved and equal water distribution from upstream to 
downstream was attained.
　Since 1999, the BATS IA has continued to introduce outside resources 
from the NIA Bohol Office and other donors, and it was finally able to 
complete the concrete lining of the whole canal of the Busao CIS in 2005. 
Thus, the BATS IA can supply sufficient water, in a timely manner, to the 
tail part of the canal. 
　The water tender is responsible for daily water allocation and canal 
cleaning. Every day, he opens and closes the intake from the water source 
(a natural spring) and removes any mud and trashes from the canal to 
allow the irrigation water to flow smoothly to the tail part. Further, he 
is responsible for allocating water as well as operating and maintaining 
irrigation facilities (intake and canal). 
　In the Busao CIS, since some parts are located on the edge of a cliff, the 
earth canal has been damaged by landslides caused by typhoons and heavy 
rain. In this case, the BATS IA has hired laborers from IA members and 
repaired the canal in a few days. Further, since the BATS IA cemented 
the whole canal, the repair work needed has become less, which has 
reduced the IA’s maintenance costs. Indeed, because of the concrete lining 
of the canal and effective daily operation and maintenance, there has been 
no water shortage downstream since, allowing the BATS IA to attain 
equal water distribution at the head and tail parts.
　c. Share of Vote at the BATS IA
　From the BATS IA, in 1998, 15 BOD members were selected from the 
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four barangays (Santo Rosario, Toril, Busao, and Agahay) (see Table 4). 
The number (proportion) of BOD members from each barangay is two 
(13.3%) from Santo Rosario, four (26.7%) from Toril, six (40.0%) from Busao, 
and three (20.0%) from Agahay. These rates closely reflect the number 
of IA members in each barangay. Therefore, the share of BOD members 
(equivalent to the share of vote of each barangay) is equivalent to the 
share of members in each barangay (equivalent to the share of cost of 
each barangay). Thus, as Freeman mentions, the share of cost is equivalent 
to the share of vote. Here, requests from IA members (e.g., repair of 
facilities) are approved in a BOD meeting related to the share of vote of 
each barangay. The barangay with the larger number of members (i.e., 
Barangay Busao) is considered to have the greater influence over decision 
making at the BOD meeting. Hence, a sense of fairness is attained among 
IA members.
　Hence, since a member’s share of water and share of vote is 
Table 4. Share of Board of Directors (BOD) per number of members in the 
BATS IA
Name of 
Barangay
Number of
Members
Share of the 
Number of 
Members (%)
Number of
BOD Members
Share of the
Number of
BOD 
Members (%)
Santo Rosario 16 (1 from 
Bitaugan)
11.0 2 13.3
Toril 33 22.8 4 26.7
Busao 70 48.3 6 40.0
Agahay 26 17.9 3 20.0
Total 145 100 15 100
Source: Author’s survey
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proportionate to his/her share of cost, a distributional share system exists 
in the BATS IA. 
4) Water Control Ability of the BATS IA
　Freeman states that among the six essential characteristics, if the first 
four are fulfilled, then the remaining two (water control ability and the 
propensity of members to support the local organization) will be realized.
　The BATS IA has high water control ability; it owns and controls the 
entire irrigation system from the water source to the downstream part. 
Since the water source is a natural spring, the volume of water decreases 
in the dry season. However, it still offers sufficient water to irrigate the 
whole CIS. 
　After the Grant Assistance from the EOJ in 1999, the canal was 
cemented to prevent further leakage in the canal and allow water to reach 
all the way downstream. This has reduced water shortages in that part, 
even in the dry season. Furthermore, since there was actually too much 
water just after the Grant Assistance Project, the BATS IA adopted a 
water management method to control the volume of water by narrowing 
the opening of the main gate at the water source. Furthermore, the BATS 
IA drained the excess water to the river in the middle part of the CIS. The 
water tender operates this allocation of water daily. 
　Later, the BATS IA planned the extension of the canal downstream and 
expansion of the irrigation area to Barangay Agahay to use the excess 
water, based on the requests of farmers there.  
　Therefore, the BATS IA provides sufficient water in a timely manner to 
all IA members; as such, it has high water control ability.
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5) Members’ Support to the BATS IA
　Leading on from the previous section, because the water control ability 
is high, so is support from members.
　As mentioned above, IA President, Mr. M, has strong leadership skills 
with regard to IA management. Therefore, the BOD and IA members do 
not allow him to resign, even though he claims that this is his wish. Indeed, 
he has been reelected every two years at the IA election with strong 
support from IA members. Members’ strong support can also be seen from 
the fact that the ISF collection rate is 100% in the BATS IA, with only a 
few cases of water stealing and disputes, which have been easily settled. 
IA members also cooperate with IA activities and adhere to IA bylaws. 
　BATS IA members typically have close social, economic, and political 
relationships of debt of gratitude. Moreover, they are highly homogeneous 
socially, economically, and culturally. Therefore, it is easy for IA leaders to 
manage members and organize them into one group. 
　In the BATS IA, the boundary of the IA covers the whole irrigated area 
of the Busao CIS. In addition, at the same time, it covers the various human 
relationships of debt of gratitude among IA members, or between IA 
members and BOD. Hence, the IA President has an obligation to provide 
the benefit of equal irrigation to all IA members. As mentioned above, he 
is capable to give many other variable benefits to IA and BOD members. 
While Mr. M passes on benefits such as irrigation water to IA members, 
the cooperative attitude of IA members to Mr. M (and BOD members) 
continues; as a result, IA members participate in activities such as ISF 
payment or cooperate to solving conflicts. 
　Hereafter, Ostrom’s model is used to assess the BATS IA’s organizational 
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performance.
6) Clearly Defined Boundaries of the BATS IA
　Ostrom states that individuals or households that have the right to 
withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must 
the boundaries of the CPR itself (see Table 1). Freeman (2009) defines 
“organizational boundaries in terms of water share ownership.” The WUA 
must clearly define its members who are entitled to receive their water 
and required to fulfill organizational obligations, such as paying the ISF. 
　The boundaries of local organizations as well as the membership of the 
BATS IA are clearly defined. Indeed, all families that cultivate farmland 
inside the Busao CIS are registered as IA members of the BATS IA, 
although some families rotate farming duties by season or year among 
family members. The BATS IA has an IA member list, which it updates 
every year. 
　Since BOD members control IA members in their barangay, no free-
rider who is a beneficiary of the irrigation system, but does not join the 
BATS IA, can exist in the Busao CIS. Here, the boundary of the CPR and 
membership are clear.
7) Collective-Choice Arrangement in the BATS IA
　In the third design principle, Ostrom states that most individuals affected 
by the operational rules can participate in modifying these rules (see Table 
1). Freeman (2009) points out that “at the level of the local commands, the 
collective choice arrangements are in the conceptual models mostly about 
administering the three-sided share system.” Hence, most WUA members 
can participate in modifying the rules of the share system such as receipt 
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of benefits (i.e., water distribution), member obligations such as ISF 
payments, and members’ voting privileges. 
　All BOD members, except those who are sick or have emergency 
situations, attend the BATS IA BOD meeting every month. At this 
meeting, BOD members discuss and amend the operational rules necessary 
for the management of the CIS. The main issues are the irrigation schedule, 
collection of ISF rice, rental of the IA tractor, distribution of good rice 
seeds, repair work on the irrigation canal, and sale of ISF rice; members 
rarely discuss dispute management or new projects for CIS rehabilitation 
or expansion.    
　The issues discussed are presented at the General Assembly, which is 
held once a year, and approved by IA members. The attendance rate for 
the General Assembly is only around 40-50 %. However, since many formal 
and informal information exchanges occur in each barangay between 
BOD and IA members, the low attendance rate is not a concern. In each 
barangay, an IA member that is a resident can receive information on 
irrigation through various social relationships. At the same time, requests 
from IA members on the repair or construction of irrigation facilities, 
new projects for the IA, and so on are heard by BOD members at each 
barangay. BOD members present the requests from each barangay at the 
monthly BOD meeting, where the requests are discussed and measures are 
decided. Through such a collective choice arrangement system, each IA 
member can participate in modifying the operational rules of the IA.
8) Monitoring in the BATS IA
　Ostrom states that monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and 
appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are 
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themselves the appropriators (see Table 1). If a clear share system 
arrangement exists, the WUA should be able to monitor whether water is 
being properly delivered to each member as planned, whether members 
have paid the ISF and fulfilled their obligations to the WUA, and whether 
collectors have remitted the ISF to the WUA.
　In the BATS IA, water delivery is monitored daily by the water tender. 
Every day, he opens and closes the intake from the natural spring, monitors 
the canal from upstream to downstream, and cleans the canal (removing 
trash and mud) in order to maintain the proper delivery of irrigation water 
and avoid water shortage.
　Monitoring of the ISF payment is also done properly in the BATS IA 
to avoid free-rider behaviors. As mentioned above, at the time of harvest, 
the water tender collects 10% of the harvested rice on the farm. The IA 
member, the tinakins, and Warehouseman oversee the ISF collection. 
Therefore, no IA member can escape the ISF payment, aside from the few 
aforementioned cases.
　The BATS IA also has a proper monitoring system for the ISF collector. 
Collected ISF rice is stored in an IA warehouse by the water tender 
and Warehouseman after collection. The Warehouseman oversees the 
water tender to avoid any misuse. Previously, at the time of the former 
water tender, there was no position of Warehouseman. The water tender 
collected ISF rice and stored it an IA warehouse alone. Mr. M felt that the 
monitoring of the water tender was insufficient and, at the next election in 
1992, he changed the water tender to the present person; at the same time, 
he established the new position of Warehouseman and assigned a BOD that 
he trusted. Further, he made the new Warehouseman always monitor the 
water tender when he collects and stores the ISF rice. By introducing such 
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a monitoring system, the BATS IA can avoid any misuse by the water 
tender (ISF collector). 
　Moreover, in the BATS IA, the Treasurer records ISF payment of each 
IA member and the expenditure of the IA. In addition, the Auditor makes 
an audit report at the BOD meeting and General Assembly. The financial 
management of the BATS IA is appropriate. Further, records of meetings 
are properly kept. The Secretary keeps the minutes of every BOD meeting 
and General Assembly. She reads the minutes from the former meeting at 
the beginning of every meeting. 
　Hence, in the BATS IA, IA activities are properly monitored, and the IA 
has effective methods to prevent the occurrence of free-rider behaviors.
9) Graduated Sanctions in the BATS IA
　Ostrom states that appropriators who violate the operational rules 
are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions by other appropriators, by 
officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both (see Table 1). 
　In the BATS IA, bylaws detail the graduated sanctions against offenses. 
At the first offense, the violator receives a warning from the IA. At the 
second offense, he or she is fined. However, violators never repeat an 
offense. Indeed, there are few conflicts, and the IA does not need to apply 
more severe sanctions than a warning. 
10) Conflict Resolution Mechanism in the BATS IA
　Ostrom points out that appropriators and officials have rapid access to 
low-cost local arenas for the resolution of conflicts among appropriators or 
between appropriators and officials (see Table 1). 
　When conflicts such as water stealing and disputes occur, the IA 
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summons both parties to the BOD meeting and the IA President explains 
and arbitrates between the two parties. Mr. M does not scold the violator 
who steals the water as a child, but explains the problem to him/her 
saying, “If there is no water, everybody has difficulty getting food. So, you 
should not steal the water.” He persuades the violator to respect his/her 
honor and not injure his/her pride. In this case, the BATS IA can make an 
amicable settlement. Since each IA member is indebted in various ways to 
Mr. M, he/she is persuaded and does not repeat the offense. 
　Additionally, in the BATA IA, cases of the non-payment of the ISF on 
the farm are rare. 
　As mentioned above, IA members have close and multiple social 
relationships, especially in the same barangay. For example, many IA 
members join the PTA of Busao Elementary School, in which the Secretary 
of the BATS IA serves as a schoolteacher. A PTA meeting is run monthly. 
Moreover, many IA members in Barangay Busao come to the sali sali 
store run by the Warehouseman of the BATS IA. There, people exchange 
information on many issues including irrigation management. Therefore, 
since IA members have close patron client relationships with the IA 
President, BOD members, and other IA members, these relationships 
function as the social sanctions to avoid offenses.
　Hence, the BATS IA has a high capacity of conflict resolution. 
11) Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize within the BATS IA
　Ostrom states that the rights of appropriators to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities (see 
Table 1). 
　In the PIM model of the NIA, the IA has clear authority over the 
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operation and maintenance of hydrologically meaningful units (the entire 
irrigation system in the CIS). Moreover, the IA holds the legal water 
rights, which protects its members’ water access, and it is registered with 
the nation’s Securities and Exchange Commission, receiving permission 
to own property, make and receive contracts, collect fees, and impose 
sanctions. Further, the IA is an autonomous unit not directly belonging to 
any governmental agency. On the contrary, the NIA helps it maintain its 
accountability to its members; the legal framework provides an enabling 
setting in which the IA can potentially play a meaningful role (Korten and 
Siy, 1989).
　In the NIA’s PIM, farmers have the right to be involved in key decisions, 
which gives them the confidence to deal with NIA staff as equals, not as 
passive recipients of governmental aid. The NIA encourages farmers to 
take a key role in the development of the irrigation system from the outset 
of the project. To promote this PIM’s idea, the NIA assigns an IDO as a 
community organizer at the beginning of the project. However, the IDO’s 
role is a supportive one; he/she does not lead the farmers, but rather 
catalyzes the development of their own leadership capacities (Siy, 1989). 
In PIM, the NIA promotes the policy that farmers play the central role in 
irrigation management, while the role of the governmental agency (i.e., the 
NIA) is to support farmers. 
　In this sense, the policy of the NIA’s PIM legally guarantees the IA’s 
right to organize as well as positively encourages farmers to organize the 
IA to be self-independent. In PIM, the IA should handle problems by itself, 
while the NIA can provide indirect support and monitoring. Moreover, the 
IA should be fully independent from the NIA’s control, as provided by its 
bylaws.
−211−
　In the BATS IA, one IDO is assigned by the NIA Bohol Provincial 
Office, and she attends every monthly BOD meeting. However, the IDO 
only observes the BOD meeting and does not intervene in the management 
of the IA. Here, the role of the IDO is to monitor the IA management and 
listen to the needs of the IA. 
　Additionally, in the model of bylaws presented by the NIA Central 
Office, the term of BOD members (including the IA President) should not 
exceed two terms (one term is one to two years), to avoid the intervention 
of factionalism or local political disputes. At the same time, this bylaw 
model aims to prevent the dominance or corruption that would be created 
if the same person were to stay in his/her position as IA leader. Moreover, 
there is a bylaw model in which the political positions above Barangay 
Official should not take the position of a BOD member in the IAⅴ.
　However, in the BATS IA, both the IA President and BOD members are 
the leaders (Barangay Captain or Official) of their own barangay. Moreover, 
they remain serving in their positions at the IA for many terms, contrary 
to the bylaw, based on the strong request of IA members. Additionally, 
BATS IA applies the ISF levied by 10% of harvested rice, that is different 
from NIA bylaw model which levies the ISF by size of area, such as 3.5 
cavans (175kg) of rice per ha. The NIA Bohol Provincial Office does not 
bring these facts into question or protest against them. On the contrary, 
the BATS IA was praised as the Most Outstanding IA in Region VII 
ⅴ　Under the IA bylaw, in Article VII. Board of Directors and Committees, Section 1. 
Number of Directors and Qualifications, 6. “He must not be holding any elective position 
in the government higher than a barangay councilman nor actively engaged in partisan 
politics.” In Article VII. Section 2. Election and Term of Office, “No director shall be 
elected for more than two consecutive terms” (Republic of the Philippines Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1998)
────────────
−212−
in June 2003 by the NIA Regional Office of Region VII. Thus, the NIA 
appreciates and respects the unique management system of the BATS IA.
　In addition, the BATS IA has healthy financial management, leading to 
independent IA management. Before 1999, in the dry season, farmers in 
Sector Busao had to rotate irrigated water which led to a decrease in rice 
harvested downstream, and thus decreased the amount of ISF collected. 
However, after the concrete lining of the canal in 1999, the amount of ISF 
increased. 
　Collected rice is sold to an intermediary in the provincial capital when 
its market price is highest. The rice sales are remitted to the bank account 
of the IA. The BATS IA uses these funds to purchase equipment and 
facilities, such as a hand tractor, thresher, and IA warehouse. Moreover, 
the IA purchases good rice seeds and distributes them to IA members. 
On the contrary, the BATS IA does not lend money to members to avoid 
jeopardizing the financial management of the IA. In other IAs, there are 
many cases where the IA has exhausted its funds and been forced to 
suspend IA activities because it has been unable to get back the money 
lent to members. The BATS IA prevents such a case.
　If the BATS IA cannot deal with a case by itself, it introduces the 
necessary outside resources by negotiating with outside governmental 
agencies and donors. As mentioned above, the BATS IA received a 
Grassroots Grant Assistance Project from the EOJ for the canal cementing 
and rehabilitation. Moreover, it requested that the NIA Bohol Provincial 
Office implement a canal extension project, and the National Food 
Authority construct a new IA warehouse. Additionally, the IA received 
a mechanical rice drier from the Congressman’s fund. Further, the 
Municipality Agriculture Office provided assistance to construct a model 
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farm of good rice seeds at Mr. M’s rice field, who negotiated with influential 
external people such as politicians (e.g., Governor and Congressman) and 
governmental officials (e.g., Director of the NIA Bohol Provincial Office), 
making full use of his patron client relationships to obtain assistance for the 
IA. Because of these efforts, the BATS IA has stable management. Thus, 
the NIA Bohol Provincial Office highly approves of its performance and 
respects its unique and self-reliant management style. 
12) Nested Enterprises
　Ostrom states that for CPRs that are part of a larger system, 
appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises 
(see Table 1). 
　The BATS IA has sufficient structure and function for nested 
enterprises. It is organizationally divided into three sectors from upstream: 
Sector Santo Rosario, Sector Toril, and Sector Busao. However, these 
sectors are just geographical divisions, and there is no activity in each 
sector. 
　On the contrary, in the BATS IA, there are four barangays. IA 
members belong to one of the four barangays, which are controlled by 
BOD members, who are also current or former Barangay Captains or 
Officials (see Figure 3). In each barangay, an assembly is held every month; 
sometimes, irrigation issues are discussed. These four barangays serve as 
the units under the IA, fulfilling the functions of monitoring, enforcement, 
and conflict resolution for IA members. 
　As mentioned above, BOD members also cooperate with Mr. M since 
they have many relationships of debt of gratitude with one another. 
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Figure 3: Management system of BATS IA managed by BODs, who are at 
same times Barangay Captain (BC) & Officials (source: Author’s 
survey)
Therefore, the IA President can manage BOD members and, then, BOD 
members manage IA members in their barangays. This is the way in 
which Mr. M gains the cooperation of IA members in other barangays, 
with regard to IA activities. This is considered to contribute to the high 
abilities of the BATS IA in monitoring violations, sanction, and conflict 
resolution.
　In summary, based on Freeman and Ostrom’s models, the organizational 
performance of the BATS IA is successful as a WUA (see Table 5).
Table 5. Evaluation of the organizational performance of the BATS IA
Indicator Evaluation Notes
Source of 
leadership
Yes 
(Local)
Mr. M is simultaneously a Barangay Captain of 
Toril, local elite, and wealthy person. He has strong 
leadership and creates patron client relationships 
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with his followers (barangay residents and IA BOD 
members).
Responsibility of 
leader and staff
Yes BOD members, who are simultaneously Barangay 
Captains or Officials, are selected by IA members 
at the IA election. BOD members serve for IA 
members “devotedly.”
Share system of 
water delivery 
and obligation
Yes A member’s share of water is equivalent to his/
her share of cost and share of vote. Since the ISF 
is set as 10% of the harvest and the collection rate 
of the ISF is 100%, a member who receives more 
water pays a higher ISF. Since the number of BOD 
members per barangay is proportionate to the 
number of IA members per barangay, a barangay 
that pays a greater ISF has a larger voice (existence 
of the distributional share system).
Head and tail 
distinction
Yes Equal  water  distribution  from  upstream  to 
downstream is attained. There is no water shortage 
downstream because of the concrete lining of the 
canal  and  daily  canal  cleaning  by  a  hired  water 
tender (existence of the distributional share system). 
Water resources 
control ability
Yes The IA owns and manages the entire irrigation 
system from the water source (a natural spring) 
to the tail parts, and it lined the earth canal with 
concrete to resolve the water shortage downstream 
in the dry season. The water tender operates 
the allocation of water daily. The IA can deliver 
sufficient water in a timely manner to members (the 
IA has high water control ability).
Members’ support Yes Members’ support to IA is high. IA members 
cooperate with IA activities and follow IA bylaws. 
IA and BOD members do not allow the IA 
President to resign.
Clearly defined 
boundaries
Yes The boundary of the irrigation area is clear. All 
beneficiaries of irrigation are registered as IA 
members. The IA updates the IA member list. 
BOD members control IA members in their 
barangays. Free-riders do not exist in the CIS.
−216−
Collective choice 
arrangement
Yes BOD members discuss the modification of the 
operational rules at the monthly BOD meeting. 
There are many formal and informal information 
exchanges at the barangay level between BOD 
and IA members. Requests from IA members are 
heard by BOD members at each barangay. BOD 
members present the requests from each barangay 
at the monthly BOD meeting, allowing IA members 
to participate in modifying the operational rules.
Monitoring Yes IA activities are monitored and reported to IA 
members. The water tender monitors the canal 
every day to attain equal water distribution.
The collection of 10% of the harvested rice as 
ISF is monitored by the IA member, harvesters, 
water tender, and Warehouseman on the farm to 
avoid free-riders. Collected ISF rice is stored in 
the IA warehouse by the water tender together 
with the Warehouseman, who oversees the water 
tender to avoid misuse. The IA Treasurer records 
the ISF collection. The Auditor’s report is done 
at the BOD meeting and General Assembly. 
The Secretary keeps and reports the minutes 
of the BOD meeting and General Assembly. 
Graduated 
sanctions
Yes IA bylaws set a rule of graduated sanctions. At the 
first offense, violators receive a warning. At the 
second offense, they are fined. However, there is no 
case of a second offense.
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms
Yes There is no case of ISF non-payment. There are 
only a few conflicts, such as water stealing and 
disputes, and these have been easily resolved inside 
the IA. IA members cooperate to resolve conflicts 
because they are indebted to the IA President 
and they have close and multiple patron client 
relationships, especially in the same barangay, 
which function as social sanctions to avoid offenses.
Minimal 
recognition of 
rights to organize
Yes The IA manages the CIS independently. The NIA 
appreciates and respects the unique management 
system of the BATS IA. The NIA IDO visits
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regularly  but  does  not  intervene  in  IA 
management. The IA was praised as the Most 
Outstanding IA in Region VII by the NIA.
Nested 
enterprises
Yes The BATS IA consists of four barangays. BOD 
members simultaneously acting as Barangay 
Captains or Officials in each barangay control IA 
members in their barangay. These four barangays 
serve as the units under the BATS IA and fulfill 
the function of monitoring, enforcement, and 
conflict resolution.
Overall 
performance
Successful
Source: Author’s survey
V. Conclusion
　One of the important factors of the successful performance of the 
BATS IA as a WUA is the competent IA President, Mr. M. However, the 
fundamental reason that Mr. M tries to distribute irrigation water equally 
to all IA members and to maintain a 100% ISF collection rate is that the 
BATS IA has a variation of a distributional share system. In the BATS 
IA, the ISF is set as 10% of the harvested rice. If an IA member receives 
more water, he/she will have more harvest; thus, 10% of harvested rice 
is considered to be almost equivalent to the volume of water that a 
member receives. As such, the water received by each member is roughly 
proportionate to the share of system costs paid by each member. Here, 
each member’s share of water is equivalent to his/her share of cost. 
Therefore, Mr. M tries his best to provide equal water distribution.
　If water shortage occurs downstream, this decreases the total ISF paid 
by members to the IA. If the IA wants to have healthy and sustainable 
financial management, it is necessary to collect much ISF. Thus, the BATS 
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IA constructed the concrete lining of the canal to ensure that irrigation 
water reaches the end of the canal downstream, introducing external aid 
from the EOJ and NIA. In the daily operation of the CIS, the IA hires a 
water tender and lets him monitor and clean the canals every day, as the 
IA watches carefully that a water shortage does not occur in the CIS. 
Consequently, by removing head and tail distinctions in service queues, the 
BATS IA can attain equal water distribution within the CIS. 
　Furthermore, in the BATS IA, the number of BOD members selected 
from each barangay is proportionate to the number of IA members of each 
barangay. Therefore, a member’s share of water is not only equivalent 
to his/her share of cost, but also to his/her share of vote. Requests from 
members are approved according to the respective share of vote of the 
barangay to which they belong. As a result, a sense of fairness is shared 
among IA members; those who bear smaller costs (upstream) do not 
receive more benefits (water). 
　Therefore, a distributional share system exists in the BATS IA, which 
Freeman (1989,1992) points out as the heart of any effective WUA, since 
share of cost, share of water, and share of vote are proportionate. 
　Furthermore, the four barangays function as subunits of the BATS IA, 
in which each Barangay Captain and Official serves as a BOD member. 
Thus, BOD members can control their barangay members, who are also IA 
members. Hence, the four barangays manage the monitoring, enforcement, 
and conflict resolution activities of the BATS IA. 
　Additionally, in the BATS IA, there are only a few cases of the violation 
of IA bylaws; moreover, even in such cases, violators are prevented from 
re-offending with just a warning by the IA President or BOD, with no 
fines needed to be applied. This is because, within each barangay, an IA 
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member has a close social relationship (patron client relationship) with the 
IA President, BOD, and other IA members. These close relationships in the 
barangay serve as a type of social sanction to avoid offenses by members.
　Moreover, since the water source of the Busao CIS is a natural spring, 
the irrigation water is abundant, even in the dry season. The BATS IA 
owns and manages the entire system of the Busao CIS from the natural 
spring to the end of the canal. Hence, it can decide the volume and timing 
of irrigation alone, giving itself the strong ability to control its water 
resources.
　In conclusion, the BATS IA has a sophisticated irrigation management 
system, which fits Ostrom’s design principles of long-enduring CPR, and 
Freeman’s essential characteristics of an effective WUA. As the BATS IA 
receives cooperation from IA members who join IA activities and follow IA 
bylaws, there are few conflicts and the IA can attain 100% ISF collection. 
Consequently, the BATS IA is able to maintain stable and successful IA 
management in the long-term.
　On the contrary, the NIA PIM does not include a distributional share 
system. The ISF is set as a fixed rate per farm size by the NIA Central 
Office and is not linked to the volume of irrigation water that each farmer 
receives (Kakuta, 2014). Since the head and tail distinction remains in 
the service queue, farmers in the tail part are disadvantaged by water 
shortages (Freeman, 1992). These farmers have to pay a relatively higher 
ISF compared with the farmers in the head part. As such, those in the tail 
part have an increased sense of unfairness toward the management of the 
IA, and the IA loses their support. 
　In addition, water delivery is not dependent on members’ fulfillment 
of their obligations to the organization. Even if a member in the tail part 
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fully pays the ISF, he/she may not receive sufficient water because of a 
water shortage. Therefore, the incentive of the IA member to pay the ISF 
remains low (Freeman, 2008). 
　Further, even if a member does not pay the ISF, or if a farmer is a non-
member, he/she can still take water from the canal, since IA members 
share common turnouts, meaning that the IA cannot apply effective 
sanctions such as stopping water delivery against the offenders. Hence, 
free-riders who break rules and continue to receive water cannot be 
avoided (Freeman, 2008). Therefore, although there is sufficient water, IA 
management is unsuccessful in the NIA PIM. The lack of a distributional 
share system in the design principles of NIA’s PIM is thought to have led 
to the unsuccessful management of CISs in the Philippines.
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